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Artificial Intelligence systems need to maintain a representation of their environment so that they 
can interpret sensory information and plan actions. This is true for robots, chess playing programs, 
question-answering systems, softbots on the web, in fact, any computer-based agent. Most such 
representations are initially hand crafted by the system’s developer then incrementally adapted by 
the addition and deletion of facts, as sensors detect environmental changes or actions make such 
changes.  
This arrangement was sufficient when agents were built only for a narrowly defined task in a fairly 
stable environment, but it is no longer sufficient for many applications.  
• In a rapidly changing environment, it will not be sufficient to add and delete a few facts in a 
representation. Not only must rules also evolve, but change to the representation’s language 
may be needed. In a multi-agent environment, agents must represent each other. Not only 
might agents change, but so might the agent population. 
• Problem solving success is very dependent on problem representation. If an agent’s tasks 
change then its old representation may no longer suit its new tasks, so it must evolve to suit 
the new problems.  
For example, suppose you have a softbot agent on the web that makes plans for you using the 
services offered by other agents. It might plan a holiday by combining taxi, plane, accommodation, 
and sightseeing services. The population of service-providing agents is huge and rapidly changing. 
The kind of tasks you set your agent may change. Your agent must be able to evolve its 
representation to match this changing environment.  
My research group has been developing algorithms to enable agents to change their 
representations. We are especially interested in conceptual changes driven by reasoning failures. For 
instance, reasoning may fail because it infers something false, fails to conclude something true or is 
just very slow at concluding anything. Diagnosis of such failures can suggest repairs to the agent’s 
faulty representation. The change required might just be to add or delete a fact, but it might instead 
be to provide a missing precondition to a rule or to change the language of the representation. 
In our softbot world, reasoning failures take the form of plans that fail on execution. The planning 
agent may then need to delete the ‘fact’ that another agent offers a service, or it may need to add a 
new precondition that another agent requires to be paid in advance. More fundamentally, agents 
may fail to communicate because they do not share a vocabulary.  Their vocabularies must then be 
aligned.  
We have developed algorithms for automating representational change in the following domains: 
web-based, service-providing agents; discrepancies between physics theories and experimental 
evidence; and mathematical proofs. Recently, we have generalised from these domain-specific 
algorithms to develop the general-purpose reformation algorithm. 
In all these applications, the following simple language changes were sufficient.  
• One concept is split into several, or several concepts are merged into one. Examples from 
physics are: splitting ‘matter’ into ‘dark matter’ and ‘visible matter’; and merging of 
‘morning star’ and ‘evening star’ into ‘Venus’.  
• A dependency may need to be added or deleted. For example, the period of a pendulum 
does depend on its length, but the acceleration of an object in free fall does not depend on 
its weight. 
Such changes may appear minor but, as the history of physics shows, they can accumulate into 
significant changes.  
Recently, we have explored algorithms for analogical blending, where two old concepts are merged 
into a new one. For instance, we can merge ‘house’ and ‘boat’ to form either ‘houseboat’ or 
‘boathouse’. ‘Houseboat’ comes from aligning the house with the boat, but ‘boathouse’ comes from 
aligning the boat with the house’s occupant.  
Analogical blends can be used to form novel concepts; an inadequate representation may be 
improved by boosting it with concepts from an analogous representation. An example, again from 
physics, is Rutherford’s model of the atom as a miniature solar system, in which the nucleus is 
aligned with the Sun and the electrons with the planets. Often, analogical blends are faulty and need 
repairing. This was true of Rutherford’s model, which failed to explain why the electrons did not 
emit radiation, lose energy and fall into the nucleus. The model was repaired with the aid of 
quantum mechanics. We have recently begun exploring how reformation can be used to repair 
faulty blends.  
Can our automated agents be claimed to create their own representations? All our algorithms only 
evolve old representations into new ones. There is no de novo creation of representations. But 
would it be reasonable to expect one? Human new representations also seem to come by analogy 
with, or repair of, old representations, informed by their failures.  
 
